Here we can establish all the initiating events
and observe the plant’s response, taking into account
the probability of each path and transient.
We will use the deterministic diagram and see the differences.
First, as you can see highlighted, it does not limit in any way
the initiating events considered,
taking into account the operational experience.
Also, it does not limit equipment failures,
nor operator errors.
It calculates them based on the analyzed situation.
And finally, it takes into account everything that affects risk,
including equipment that is not a safety class.
It allows performing sensitivity analysis in order to know
to what extent the data used impact on the final result.
This is very important because it facilitates the identification
of the data to which more attention must be paid
in order to ensure that it's correct.
Also, it allows to have a clear idea of the systems and components
or operator actions that have a significant contribution
to the risk of the plant.
But it does not control very well the hypotheses made in the analysis.
And this is a limitation.
But many actions are taken that improve safety.
Also, it doesn't adequately address
the aspects related to culture or organization,
although these aspects, in the medium term, could have
an influence on the data used in the APS.
So, we have three different levels
in the analysis or assessment.
The first level is the identification of sequences of damage
to the core by internal or external events and fires.
It will take the quantification of the NDF
and the importance analysis.
Also, the second level is from the DN sequences calculation
of the probability of containment failure.
And it will determine what they call "Large Early Releases Frequency"
or term source.
That is related to that containment failure.
And finally, we have the third level, that is the estimation of damages
or consequences.
And in those damages and consequences, we have loss of human life,
damage to the environment and material losses.
That, as you can imagine, happens when the level scales to the level three.
Also, we said that we could divide elements in three important groups.
We already saw this.
Those elements considered safety related and those not related to safety.
All the elements relevant for safety, or safety related,
are included in Tech Specs.
We can define relevant elements for safety.
And here we have any element that is not considered
to be part of the safety elements,
but whose operation is giving credit
to mitigate anticipated operational events
or accidents.
Or it's used in emergency operating procedures.
Also, we have all those elements
whose failure can prevent safety elements from fulfilling
their safety functions.
And finally, in this pack, we have, or in this section, we have
all those elements whose failure may cost the performance
of a safety element.
And finally, we have all those safety related elements
or safety elements, i.e., those elements whose operation is credited
in the analyses of design basis accidents
for taking the installation to a safe condition
and keep it in a such long term condition,
limiting all the radiological consequences
of anticipated operation events and of the basis design accidents
within their specified limits.
And here we have a list of SSC
whose malfunction or failure could expose personnel or public to the radiation.
Also, that prevent the expected operative event
from giving rise to accident conditions.
And finally, that are intended to mitigate consequences
of a malfunction of other SSC's.